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Shades of Gray: Internal Control Reporting by Chinese U.S.-listed Firms 
 
Chinese firms listing in the U.S. via reverse mergers (CRMs) have dominated prior media, regulator and 
research attention. Yet CRMs have effectively ceased, leaving Chinese firms listing via initial public 
offerings (CIPOs) as the relevant remaining class of Chinese firms listing on U.S. exchanges. This study 
documents salient differences between CIPOs, CRMs and U.S.-domiciled U.S.-listed firms by examining 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 302 and 404 ineffective internal control (IIC) and related disclosures that 
underlie financial reporting quality, with three main findings. First, both CIPOs and CRMs report 
significantly more IICs than U.S.-domiciled counterparts. Second, both CIPOs and CRMs under-report 
IICs to a greater degree than U.S.-domiciled counterparts (CIPO for only 302 disclosures). Third, CIPOs 
report and under-report IICs significantly less than CRMs. Collectively, our results clarify and recast prior 
characterizations of internal controls underlying the reporting quality of Chinese firms listed in the U.S. 
and elsewhere.  
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listed Firms; Reverse Mergers 
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Shades of Gray: Internal Control Reporting by Chinese U.S.-listed Firms  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chinese U.S.-listed firms have attracted considerable media, regulator and research attention 
amid allegations of financial reporting weaknesses.1 To date attention has focused on Chinese firms 
listing in the U.S. via reverse mergers (CRMs)2 rather than via initial public offerings (CIPOs). Yet 
CIPOs are salient for several reasons. First, new CRM listings have virtually ceased as CIPO listings 
continue, leaving CIPOs as the relevant remaining class of Chinese U.S. listers (Shih 2015; Thomas and 
Barreto 2014). Second, the market value of CIPOs far exceeds that of CRMs.3 Third, whereas prior 
evidence finds CRM financial reporting concerns to have “spilled over” to CIPOs (Ang, Jiang, and Wu 
2014; Darrough et al. 2015), little evidence exists regarding differences in their internal controls that may 
have informed these spillovers. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently signaled a 
heighted regulatory focus on internal controls over financial reporting (Scheck 2016), making evidence 
regarding differences timely. 
This study examines both Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) Section 302 and Section 404(b) ineffective 
internal control reports (hereafter 302 and 404, respectively, and IICs collectively) to gain insights that 
augment and extend prior findings focusing on CRMs (e.g., Lee, Li and Zhang, 2015; Darrough, Huang, 
and Zhao, 2015; Chen, Cheng, Lin, Lin, and Xiao, 2016; Mao and Ettredege, 2016). Because 302 (404) 
disclosures are the statutory responsibility of firm managers (auditors), examining both 302 and 404 
                                                     
1 Representative headlines include “Chinese stock scams are the latest U.S. import” (Vlastelica & Bases, Reuters, May 11, 2011), 
“China’s U.S.-listed stocks are junk” (Stephen, Market Watch, July 10, 2011), “Falling out of love with China” (Sternberg, Wall 
Street Journal, November 17, 2011). In 2010, the PCAOB drew their attention to the auditors of CRMs in both a Staff Audit 
Practice Alert and through a meeting of the Board's Standing Advisory Group (PCAOB 2010). Prior studies that focus primarily 
on CRMs include Lee, Li and Zhang, 2015; Darrough, Huang, and Zhao, 2015; Chen, Cheng, Lin, Lin, and Xiao, 2016; and Mao 
and Ettredege, 2016. 
2 In our study period, Chinese firms have constituted fully half of U.S. foreign initial public offerings and over 80 percent of 
foreign reverse merger listings (Gao, Ritter, and Zhu 2013; Givoly, Hayn, and Lourie 2014). A reverse merger occurs when an 
operational private company acquires a publically listed shell company, with little or no assets, and then injects private company 
assets into the public shell, effectively circumventing the IPO vetting process. In addition to this lower oversight, reverse mergers 
are also faster to complete and less expensive than listings via IPOs. See Lee et al. (2015) and Chen et al. (2016) for further 
background on reverse mergers. 
3 Our sample, which is biased toward including relatively high value CRMs, shows CIPOs to have 8.5 times higher average 
market value than CRMs, and these size differences preceded the fraud crisis beginning in 2010. 
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disclosures provides opportunities to compare managerial and auditor influences on IIC reporting and 
under-reporting. 302 disclosures also provide more complete coverage of Chinese U.S.-listed firms, since 
approximately half are non-accelerated SEC filers, and thus exempt from 404 reporting examined in most 
prior studies. 
To explain the ineffective internal control (IIC) reporting patterns of CIPOs and CRMs, we apply 
predictions of cultural influence and reputational bonding theory. Cultural influence when applied to 
Chinese U.S.-listed firms predicts that they will report more IICs, and under-report more IICs, than 
comparable U.S.-domiciled U.S.-listers.4 When applied CIPOs that self-select to list via more arduous 
“front door” listing procedures, reputational bonding predicts lower CIPO IIC reporting, and lower under-
reporting, in comparison to CRMs that use expedited “back-door” listings. As explained in Section 2, 
countervailing institutional features of the China context render predictions of reputational bonding more 
nuanced than for non-Chinese foreign U.S.-listers previously studied. 
When testing for IIC reporting and under-reporting we control for firm characteristics using the 
determinant model of Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney Jr (2007) (ACK) and matched sample 
analyses for 2008–2012 to provide the following new findings. First, consistent with cultural influence 
predictions, we find that both CIPOs and CRMs report more IICs than domestic public U.S. firms (H1). 
Second, applying an under-reporting measure following Gong, Ke, and Yu (2013), we find CIPOs and 
CRMs to under-report IICs more than U.S.-domiciled U.S.-listed firms (H2), with CIPO under-reporting 
for only for 302 disclosures, suggesting that auditors influence the decision to under-report. Third, we 
find that CIPOs report fewer IICs than CRMs (H3).  Fourth, we document that CIPOs under-report IICs 
less than CRMs for 404 disclosures (H4). Overall, these findings highlight salient differences in the 
                                                     
4As reactively highlighted by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), “weak internal controls and lack of 
robust governance mechanisms have been observed in companies in certain emerging market countries. This may stem from a 
lack of familiarity in local cultures with certain governance concepts, such as prohibition of self-dealing, even where similar legal 
concepts exist. For example, such a culture might provide opportunities for management to influence other senior company 
officials or various third parties to provide false or misleading information to the company's auditors. If criticizing or questioning 
a figure of authority is contrary to the local culture, the company's employees may be hesitant to express any concerns about 
management's actions to an auditor. Such an environment can provide additional opportunities for management to override 
controls or intentionally misstate the financial statements” (page 8, SAPA No. 8, 2011). See also discussion in Section 6. 
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internal controls and internal control reporting between CIPOs and their U.S.-domiciled matched 
counterparts, and between CIPOs and the previously more studied CRMs. 
To corroborate and extend these findings, we present evidence regarding IIC reporting during a 
period of selective, intense regulatory and public scrutiny of Chinese U.S.-listed firms’ financial 
reporting, beginning in 2010. Our findings reveal that during this scrutiny period, manager-provided 302 
disclosures by CIPOs rose toward the level of auditor-provided 404 disclosures, which did not 
significantly change, consistent with scrutiny motivating enhanced managerial compliance in IIC 
reporting; whereas CRMs had significant increases in 302 and 404 reporting during the scrutiny period. 
We present additional corroborative descriptive evidence regarding the auditors of CIPOs versus CRMs, 
with robustness checks lending additional support to these findings. 
These findings extend several research streams. First, they document clear evidence regarding the 
internal controls and internal control reporting of CIPOs, which now constitute the relevant remaining 
class of Chinese foreign listings. Second, our new evidence of more IIC reporting and under-reporting by 
both CIPOs and CRMs than matched U.S.-domiciled U.S. listers helps to explain the observed spillover 
stock devaluation, short-selling effects, and incomplete investor discrimination observed in Darrough et 
al. (2015), and as such help answer Ang et al.’s (2014, 2) question of “Why did US investors and analysts 
indiscriminately dump all Chinese shares?” Third, our findings help reinterpret the survival and reported 
performance of CRMs (Lee et al. 2015), since survival can be prolonged through under-reporting IICs, 
and performance is a function of the financial reporting process. Fourth, our finding of higher IIC 
disclosures for CRMs compared with CIPOs complements Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu’s (2014) finding of 
fewer restatements in weak rule of law countries to indicate that the use of restatements to infer CRM 302 
under-reporting is problematic (Mao and Ettredge 2016). Fourth, our findings have regulatory 
implications in qualifying an inference in Kinney and Shepardson (2011) that 404 auditor assessments 
may not be necessary beyond manager-disclosed 302 IICs per a recent 404 exemption for foreign non-
accelerated filers, particularly for Chinese U.S.-listed firms. 
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Our results also provide evidence on whether SOX internal control provisions have been effective 
in meeting their stated goals for Chinese U.S.-listed firms.5 In particular, our findings of higher IIC 
reporting and under-reporting by both CIPOs and CRMs compared with U.S.-domiciled U.S.-listed firms 
indicate that SOX provisions have been ineffective for Chinese listers, particularly for 302 reporting. Our 
auditor evidence complements previously observed associations between auditor quality and internal 
controls (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Ettredge, Heintz, Li, and Scholz 2011) in justifying PCAOB 
concerns regarding the audit quality of Chinese U.S.-listed firms (PCAOB 2010). With Chinese firms also 
listing on other stock exchanges outside of the U.S., including by reverse merger on China’s own 
exchanges (Ren 2016; Yu 2016), our CIPO and CRM IIC reporting findings help inform interpretations 
and regulation of financial reporting by these prominent and controversial classes of listers in the U.S. and 
globally. 
In Section 2, we present the context and theory that motivate our hypotheses. In Section 3, we 
describe our hypothesis tests. In Section 4, we present sample selection procedures and descriptive 
statistics, and in Section 5, we discuss the results. Section 6 presents supplementary analyses and Section 
7 provides a concluding discussion. 
2. BACKGROUND, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
U.S. listings by Chinese domiciled firms began in earnest in the early 1990s, and by the mid-
2000s, this “coming out party” (Hennock 2004) had attracted considerable U.S. investor interest in stocks 
that ostensibly combined China’s rapid growth, international diversification and financial reporting 
overseen by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Chinese firms were drawn to U.S. 
stock markets for capital, liquidity, and listing provisions unavailable in China6, and soon constituted 
                                                     
5 Per PCAOB member Jeannette Frazel, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted to provide better protection for investors by 
improving the reliability of corporate financial reporting and disclosures under the securities laws. Continued research and 
analysis are important to assess how breakdowns occurred in auditing and governance systems” (2011, 924). 
6 For example, dual-class shares are not presently permitted by Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, which was 
a deciding factor in Alibaba’s decision to list in the U.S. instead of in China. 
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fully half of U.S. foreign initial public offerings and over 80 percent of foreign reverse merger listings 
(Gao et al. 2013; Givoly et al. 2014). Yet these apparent benefits were overtaken in 2010 by media 
scrutiny and regulator accusations of financial reporting improprieties by Chinese U.S.-listed firms 
(Holmes 2010), leading the Bloomberg China-U.S. Equity Index to plunge 58.5 percent over a five-and-a-
half month period (Yuk and Massoudi 2013). These financial reporting concerns brought Chinese U.S.-
listed firms, auditors, exchanges and regulators to loggerheads as Chinese firms’ access to capital 
plummeted (Ang et al. 2014). Related reporting and regulatory responses reverberate to the present, 
including U.S. de-listings by CRMs, re-listings in China stymied by IPO restrictions and high volatility 
(Osawa and Wei 2015), a Chinese government-mandated freeze on and subsequent promotion of IPO 
listings (Chen and Zhang 2017; Ren 2016; Yu 2016), and market interventions leading to a nearly 50 
percent drop in the Shanghai index during 2015–16, all of which benefits from evidence regarding 
internal controls and internal control reporting by CIPOs and CRMs.7 
CIPO and CRM Literature 
Prior evidence focusing on CRMs includes Chen et al. (2016), who find weaker financial 
reporting quality and corporate governance than for matched U.S. IPOs and CIPOs, but do not examine 
CIPOs separately. Mao and Ettredge (2016) find no difference in CRM likelihood to report an adverse 
302 compared with other U.S.-listed firms when internal control weakness exists (proxied by a 
subsequent restatement) and CRMs to have a higher likelihood of adverse 302 reports. However, evidence 
in (Srinivasan et al. 2014) of opportunistic under-reporting of restatements by foreign listers together with 
a higher baseline of adverse 302 reporting by CRMs confounds the use of restatements as a benchmark 
for under-reporting in this setting. Lee et al. (2015) find the performance and survival of CRMs to exceed 
that of U.S. reverse merger firms (USRMs) during three years following listings. However, Lee et al. do 
not examine CIPOs, and because poor CRM financial reporting quality could have boosted reported 
                                                     
7 Representative headlines include “China Reconsiders the Homecoming Party” (Cao and Xie 2016) and “Chinese Regulator 
Probes Six Companies in IPO Fraud Crackdown” (Gao 2016). 
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performance and delayed delistings, an alternative explanation is that investors were less able to 
distinguish good from bad apples as suggested by Ang et al. (2014). We contribute to this literature by 
explicitly testing for differences in IIC reporting and under-reporting between CIPOs and domestic U.S.-
listed counterparts, and between CIPOs and heretofore more studied CRMs. Further, our CRM findings 
help address whether the stock reaction spillover documented by Darrough et al. could be attributable to a 
propensity by CRMs to under-report IICs, whether prior evidence regarding CRM IIC reporting reflects 
methodological features, and whether prior CRM findings remains applicable to Chinese U.S.-listed firms 
that are increasingly CIPOs.  
IIC Reporting Requirements 
Sections 302 and 404 of SOX substantially enhanced U.S. financial reporting requirements 
regarding internal controls (Engel, Hayes, and Wang 2007; Zhang 2007). Section 302 requires managers 
of U.S.-listed firms to assess and report their firms’ IICs quarterly to the SEC, whereas Section 404 
requires auditors to assess and attest to their clients’ internal controls annually. Regulators envisioned that 
the resulting higher quality internal controls induced by 302 and 404 reporting would enhance financial 
reporting quality and regulatory compliance (SOX, 2002). Subsequent research indicates that effective 
internal controls are associated positively with financial reporting quality (Goh and Li 2011) and accruals 
quality (Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007b; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond 2008). However, 
differences in cultural, institutional, and legal contexts may induce managers of Chinese U.S.-listed firms 
to interpret and implement IIC reporting requirements differently than U.S.-domiciled counterparts. 
Cultural Behavior Effects and IIC Reporting 
Prior research indicates that national culture is an informal institution that affects financial 
reporting practices (Salter and Niswander 1995) beyond formal institutional environment effects (Peng, 
Wang, and Jiang 2008). Specifically, collectivistic cultures like China’s (Tu, Lin, and Chang 2011; 
Hofstede 2007) tend to have higher differential treatment of in-groups and out-groups. Chinese managers 
are more likely to favor the interests of the organization or concentrated owners (their in-group) at the 
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cost of foreign investors (their out-group). Thus, they are likely to place less emphasis on the importance 
of financial disclosures and transparency for such investors as suggested by Chow, Deng, and Ho (2000) 
and Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, and Lucca (1988). Cullen, Parboteeah, and Hoegl (2004) present 
large-scale multinational survey evidence that national cultural values of individualism and achievement 
(universalism and pecuniary materialism) reduce (increase) a manager’s tendency to justify ethically 
questionable behaviors; Cullen et al. (2004) find similar effects for the degree of educational attainment. 
Given that China is generally less individualistic culturally, with less developed investor protection 
provisions, this evidence suggests that Chinese managers may less attuned to SOX’s internal control 
reporting objectives and requirements with respect to internal control systems and IIC disclosures. 
An additional cultural dimension that can influence internal control system effectiveness is 
advocacy participation. Advocacy participation refers to a willingness to speak out, even controversially, 
to effect beneficial change in an organization (Van Dyne and LePine 1998). Although advocacy 
participation is commonly viewed as constructive in Western organizations (Van Dyne and LePine 1998; 
Turnipseed and Rassuli 2005), Farh, Chen-Bo, and Organ (2004) find it largely absent in organizational 
citizenship behaviors in Chinese companies. Farh et al. (2004) argue that China’s interpersonal 
relationships are characterized by single group networks that make conflict riskier because escalation can 
lead to social alienation. This relative absence of advocacy participation in Chinese firms may reduce the 
effectiveness of internal controls and/or the reporting of IICs. 
We apply this reasoning from prior cultural behavior research to predict, as a framing hypothesis, 
that both CIPOs and CRMs will report more IICs than their U.S.-domiciled counterparts, ceteris paribus: 
Hypothesis 1. CIPOs and CRMs are more likely to report IICs than U.S.-listed U.S.-domiciled firms.8 
                                                     
8 Mao and Ettredge (2016) find CRMs to be more likely to issue 302 reports than other listed firms. We likewise examine CRMs 
when testing Hypothesis 1 both to benchmark our findings with prior results and to validate that this relation for 302 disclosures 
is also associated with 404 reports that we also examine. 
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Cultural Behavior Effects and IIC Under-Reporting 
Following from the discussion and evidence above, factors that may lead to weaker internal 
controls may similarly motivate under-reporting of IICs once discovered, although prior evidence is 
limited, especially for CIPOs. Gong et al. (2013) investigate the effect of excess voting rights over cash 
flow rights of concentrated owners on IIC misreporting by cross-listed firms in weak institutional 
environments. With only seven Chinese firms in their sample, they do not draw inferences regarding their 
IIC under-reporting, nor do they examine the effect of their listing methods. Srinivasan et al. (2014) 
provide evidence that weak home-country investor protections can lead to opportunistic under-restating of 
financials. Using a sample of U.S. firms that restated their financial results, Rice and Weber (2012) show 
over half under-reported 404 IICs, but they did not specifically examine Chinese U.S.-listed firms. 
Chinese firms, in particular, have experienced lower enforcement risk due to the barriers U.S. 
regulators faced in conducting China-related investigations. In particular, the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission’s 2005 annual report explicitly recommended to the U.S. Congress that the 
SEC work with foreign regulatory counterparts to enhance enforcement of securities regulations (USCC 
2005). However, the SEC took no immediate action to protect investors from the predicted systemic risk 
amid accumulating complaints regarding the financial reporting of Chinese U.S.-listed firms. When the 
SEC began to discipline Chinese U.S.-listed firms in 2010 (Eden and Holmes 2010), the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) responded by prohibiting their auditors from providing 
requested audit documents to SEC fraud investigations, thereby impeding enforcement (Shih 2013). 
Although the PCAOB and the CSRC signed an agreement in 2013 allowing the PCAOB to access certain 
audit documents, which are first CSRC-screened, access is still incomplete and tenuous (Commons and 
Goldman 2014; PCAOB 2016). This resulting weaker enforcement of nominally strong financial 
reporting requirements for Chinese U.S.-listed firms may have reduced managerial incentives to self-
report IICs under Section 302 relative to perceived enforcement exposure under Section 404 for their 
auditors. We utilize these differential reporting incentives between SOX 302 and 404 as a design feature 
below. 
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Applying this reasoning, we provide evidence regarding potential under-reporting of IICs by 
Chinese U.S.-listed firms by testing the following hypothesis, ceteris paribus: 
Hypothesis 2. CIPOs and CRMs are more likely to under-report IICs than U.S.-listed U.S.-domiciled 
firms.9 
Reputational Bonding Theory 
Reputational bonding theory suggests distinctions between CIPOs and CRMs in internal control 
system design and reporting. Specifically, Siegel (2005) proposes a variant of institutional bonding that 
suggests cross-sectional variation in IIC reporting based on the reputational benefits of an IPO listing. 
Siegel argues that when regulatory stringencies are only weakly enforced, legal bonding is not effective, 
yet foreign listers can still benefit from cross-listing by building their reputation by self-selecting to make 
additional disclosures. Thus, whereas the institutional bonding hypothesis framed in legal terms predicts 
that there may be no difference between CIPO and CRM IIC reporting and under-reporting in the absence 
of rigorous enforcement, firms may be motivated by reputational benefits instead. Because IPOs are more 
visible and include underwriter certification and exchange screening and scrutiny, firms motivated by 
reputational bonding will more likely self-select to list via IPO than via reverse merger. Consistent with 
Jensen’s (1993) assertion that the two key forces protecting investors are the institutional environment 
and a firm’s internal control systems, CIPOs can thus be expected to implement more effective internal 
controls and reporting. By comparison, CRMs that have self-selected a less visible and expedited listing 
method less conducive to reputational signaling will have less incentive toward strong internal controls 
and transparent IIC disclosures. 
There are also countervailing forces related to China that may influence the listing decision of 
Chinese firms beyond reputational bonding motivations. Specifically, Chinese firms may have compelling 
                                                     
9 If Chinese U.S.-listed firms under-report extant IICs for whatever reason, including cultural influence, weaker corporate 
governance, unfamiliarity with U.S. reporting provisions, and/or perceptions of weak prior enforcement as discussed above, it 
will bias findings against the hypothesized relations in H1. As such, evidence that supports H2 by construction also provides 
support for H1. 
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alternative reasons for accessing U.S. capital markets, including China’s multiple freezes on IPOs (Li 
2013), generally slower IPO processing (Ren 2014), and liquidity constraints encountered in China’s 
capital markets (Thomas and Barreto 2014). CRMs also have unique motivations for reverse merger 
listings that are not related to internal controls: firms in sensitive industries that use variable interest entity 
(VIE) structures to circumvent restrictions on foreign ownership may choose a reverse merger to avoid  
making required IPO disclosures that may draw attention from Chinese regulators wary of “creative 
compliance” with foreign investment laws (Gillis and Lowry 2014). Thus, whereas reputational bonding 
predicts lower IIC reporting and under-reporting by CIPOs than by CRMs, China’s unique market and 
regulatory motivations make this an empirical question. We assess potential reputational bonding 
differences between CIPOs and CRMs in IIC reporting and under-reporting using bi-directional 
hypotheses H3 and H4, respectively, both ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 3. IIC reporting differs between CIPOs and CRMs. 
Hypothesis 4. IIC under-reporting differs between CIPOs and CRMs. 
3. METHOD AND MEASURES 
IIC Dependent Variables 
We use 302 and 404 disclosures to compare the likelihood of CIPOs, CRMs, and U.S.-domiciled 
firms to report IICs. This contrasts with a focus in prior research on 404 reporting by the reasoning that 
audited reports provide more credible evidence (e.g., Kim, Song, and Zhang, 2011; Rice and Weber 2012; 
Rice, Weber, and Biyu, 2015). However, little direct evidence exists regarding whether 404 disclosures 
provide more credible evidence of IICs,10 and conversely, Beneish, Billings, and Hodder (2008) find 
information content for only 302 reports in market reaction tests of 302 and 404 reports. 
                                                     
10 In their review of the first decade of SOX research, Coates and Srinivasan (2014) do not mention any studies comparing 302 
and 404 disclosures. 
  
11 
Examining both 302 and 404 disclosures provides several advantages. First, because 302 
reporting is quarterly versus annually for 404 reporting, 302 reports provide more timely indicators of 
IICs. Second, a comparison of 302 and 404 reports enables a comparison of management versus auditor 
reporting, thus helping reveal the effects of auditor influence on IIC under-reporting. Tellingly,  studies 
find that for 302 filers, managers tend to report fewer IICs than auditors, and auditors often override 
management assessments of IICs (Bedard and Graham 2011; Munsif, Raghunandan, and Rama 2013). 
Third, given the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act’s (Dodd-Frank) provision permanently exempting non-accelerated 
filers from 404 auditor reporting, 302 reports are the only indicator of IICs for almost half of Chinese 
U.S.-listed firms. We measure IICs using both 302 and 404 disclosures, where 302 (404) is an indicator 
set to “1” when there is a report of IICs under SOX 302 (404) provisions by a management (auditor) 
during a year. 
Tests of IIC Reporting (H1 and H3) 
In our empirical tests, we control for firm characteristics that influence IICs in two ways. First, 
we use a modified ACK internal control deficiency determinant model. Second, we use a matched control 
sample of firm-years, with matching procedures as described below. 
Modified ACK model. We employ the following ACK model to control for determinants related 
to IICs (see Appendix 1 for variable definitions and constructions):  
302 / 404 =  β0 + β1CIPO + β2CRM + β3USIPO + β4USRM + β5RANKGROWTH  (1)  
+ β6BUSSEGS + β7FOREIGNSALES + β8RESTRUCTURE + β9M&A    
+ β10BIG4AUD  + β11INVENTORY + β12LNMARKETVAL + β13RANKZ   
+ β14LOSS + ε 
A significant and positive β1 and β2 would support hypothesis H1 for CIPOs and CRMs, respectively. We 
test whether CIPOs differ from CRMs in reporting IICs (H3) by testing whether β1 equals β2 in estimated 
equation (1). 
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We modify slightly ACK’s model 1 to reflect our research focus on the IICs of Chinese U.S.-
listed firms. Specifically, we add CIPO and CRM indicators and test for a significantly positive β1 on 
CIPO and β2 on CRM to test hypothesis H1. Our measures of CIPO, CRM, USIPO, and USRM are 
indicators of listing since 2000, and control for a recent listing effect, reflecting prior evidence that firms 
that list by IPO tend to differ from those that list by reverse merger (Adjei, Cyree, and Walker 2008; 
Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins III 2005). ACK employ data from three consecutive firm-years for the 
GROWTH, RESTRUCTURE, M&A, and LOSS measures; to lessen the resulting loss of firm-years, we 
employ one-year measures (with qualitatively similar findings for three-year measures as in ACK). We 
omit ACK’s measure of prior year auditor resignation because, in our setting, a large proportion of CIPO 
and CRM firm-years contain auditor changes commensurate with going public and/or a U.S. listing 
(Coates and Srinivasan 2014)11. We add BIG4AUD to the ACK model to control for the effects of auditor 
quality on IICs. Because IICs may be concentrated in industries and on exchanges that may be correlated 
with our Chinese firm sample, we control for industry and exchange fixed effects. To mitigate the effect 
of outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom one percent of all continuous variables. 
Matched regression. In addition to the ACK model, we employ a matching algorithm to further 
control for other determinants of IICs. Our algorithm matches each Chinese firm-year with a U.S.-listed 
domestic firm-year with the same year, listing exchange (NYSE/AMEX, NASDAQ, OTC, pink sheets), 
industry (Fama-French 48), and then nearest total assets,12 without replacement, similar to Lang, Lins, and 
Miller (2003); Lee et al. (2015) and Chen et al. (2016). We match on exchange because exchange is an 
endogenous choice that can capture unobservable characteristics such as motivation to avoid listing 
requirements (in the case of a lower quality exchange), or the desire for visibility or liquidity (in the case 
                                                     
11 Correspondingly, an internal control weakness determinant model by Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007a), contemporary to ACK, 
does not include auditor changes in its model. 
12 We match by total assets rather than market value of equity given evidence that foreign reverse mergers are discounted (Givoly 
et al. 2014), and that the spillover effects of alleged accounting scandals to nonaccused Chinese U.S.-listed firms were broad 
(Ang et al. 2014; Darrough et al. 2015) and persists at least a year (Darrough et al. 2015). We perform a robustness check with 
qualitatively similar but somewhat weaker results, commensurate with market value of equity providing generally smaller U.S.-
domiciled matches. 
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of a higher quality exchange) (Baker and Johnson 1990; Corwin and Harris 2001). For example, Choi, 
Kim, Liu, and Simunic (2009) find that audit quality for cross-listed firms (proxied by audit fee premium) 
was incrementally higher for those listed on a major exchange, and Shi, Magnan, and Kim (2012) find 
cross-listers on major exchanges to be more likely to issue management earnings forecasts. We match by 
industry because firm characteristics, such as fraud incidence (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and 
Lapides 2000), can vary by industry. We perform this match separately for 302 filers and the subset of 
404 filers. 
Tests of IIC Under-reporting (H2 and H4) 
Past measures of IIC under-reporting include restatements (Rice and Weber 2012; Mao and 
Ettredge 2016), patterns of reporting (Kim et al. 2011) and predicting IICs using a discriminant model 
(Gong et al. 2013). The use of restatements in our setting is problematic, as indicated by Srinivasan et al. 
(2014), who find that U.S.-listed foreign firms are less likely to restate earnings, particularly when they 
are from weak legal environments. Under-reporting measures based on reporting patterns can be 
confounded by underlying IIC incidence. For example, a higher (lower) percentage of firms exhibiting 
years in which 404 IICs are preceded by no 302 IICs may simply be due to a higher (lower) incidence of 
underlying IICs for the subgroup, which mechanically makes this condition more (less) likely, rather than 
due to management reporting choices. For these reasons, we follow Gong et al. (2013), which investigates 
IIC reporting by cross-listed firms in two stages. In a first stage, they predict IIC using the coefficients 
from ACK’s estimation. In a second stage, they test for significant effects of ownership structure and 
institutional environment on predicted IIC reporting. In our first stage, we similarly model the likelihood 
of having IICs by converting equation (1) into a determinant model by eliminating the variables of 
interest.13 Equation (2) is similar to ACK’s internal control discovery model (their model 1). We also add 
exchange fixed effects to control for firm characteristics related to exchange: 
                                                     
13 We do not use ACK’s coefficients as in Gong et al. (2013) because ACK’s estimation is for a time period immediately after the 
passage of SOX during a time of adoption experimentation. Gong et al.’s study is similarly during the period of initial SOX 
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302 / 404 =  β0 + β1GROWTH + β2BUSSEGS + β3M&A + β4RESTRUCTURE  (2) 
+ β5BIG4AUD + β6LNASSETS + β7RANKZ + β8LOSS + ε 
Estimating equation (2) for our full sample of 302 and our subsample of 404 firm-years, we 
predict the likelihood of an IIC report for each firm (UNDERREPORT_IIC). We then apply a second-
stage ordinary least squares regression of UNDERREPORT_IIC on incentives to disclose IICs. We 
estimate this second stage on the subset of firms that did not report an IIC (i.e., 302/404 is equal to zero) 
since we are interested only in firms that under-report.14 The second-stage model thereby tests for 
differential under-reporting of only a subset of our treatment firm-years with clean IIC reports, while 
controlling for other incentives to disclose IICs. Testing hypothesis H2 takes the following form: 
UNDERREPORT_IIC = β0 + β1CIPO + β2 CRM + β3USIPO + β4USRM + β5BIG4AUD  (3) 
+ β6LITIGATION + ε 
A significant and positive β1 and β2 would support hypothesis H2 for CIPOs and CRMs, respectively. We 
assess whether CIPOs differ from CRMs in under-reporting IICs (H4) by testing whether β1 equals β2 in 
estimated equation (3). ACK include four measures to model IIC disclosure incentives. We omit 
concentration of institutional ownership and restatements for three reasons. First, concerns regarding 
these measures as reviewed by Leone (2007); second, to avoid possible differences in institutional 
ownership among foreign listers; and third, in view of Srinivasan et al.’s (2014) finding of opportunistic 
under-restating by foreign listers.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
adoption. Because our setting follows the initial adoption period of SOX as a design feature, including the issuance of clarifying 
guidance (PCAOB 2007), adoption of ACK’s coefficients would be inappropriate. Therefore, we run our ACK-based first stage 
model to obtain PREDICTED_IIC. 
14 Gong et al. (2013) construct a misreport measure (ICD_MISREPORT) that includes both under- and over-reporting states of 
ineffective internal controls (they term internal disclosure controls ICDs). In our notation, their ICD_MISREPORT is equal to 
UNDERREPORT_IIC minus 302/404. Their ICD_MISREPORT has a bimodal distribution that ranges between -1 to +1, and they 
run their analysis with their full sample. Because our treatment firms have dramatically higher IIC propensity, in our setting the 
construction of Gong et al.’s (2013) ICD_MISREPORT measure would generate a significantly more negative ICD_MISREPORT 
measure due to disproportionate Chinese-firm clustering in the first peak of the bimodal distribution (302/404 equal to 1). 
Therefore, employing their ICD_MISREPORT measure on our whole population would confound our ability to investigate under-
reporting. Since our under-reporting research question involves the second peak of the ICD_MISREPORT distribution (302/404 
equal to 0), we investigate only potential under-reporters (where 302/404 equal to 0). 
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4. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Sample Selection 
Our treatment sample of Chinese U.S.-listed firms is comprised of those that first listed in the 
U.S. either by IPO or by reverse merger during the period 2000–2012. Table 1 summarizes sample firm 
identification and data collection sources, and resultant firm-year sample sizes, and details of our sample 
construction are provided in Appendix Sample selection. 
******* Table 1 about here ******* 
We collected requisite firm-year data from Compustat and Audit Analytics for the years 2008–
2012. We did not include firm-years prior to 2008 due to the regulatory clarification process from the 
time of SOX adoption through the PCAOB’s Audit Standard No. 5 at the end of 2007 (Coates and 
Srinivasan 2014). Further, we excluded firm-years with less than $20 million in revenues, firms in 
financial industries (SIC codes 6000–6999), and the twelve dual-listed firms. Our findings are not 
sensitive to these selection criteria (see robustness checks in Section 6). 
Our resulting final treatment sample is comprised of 374 firm-years for 111 CIPOs and 448 firm-
years for 144 CRMs between 2008-2012, inclusive. The sampling procedure substantially reduces the 
number of USRM observations due to variable requirements (by 42 percent) and minimum revenue size 
$20 million (by 52 percent), which documents fundamental differences between USRMs and CRMs that 
reinterpret prior findings that use USRMs as a control group (Lee et al. 2015; Mao and Ettredge 2016) as 
discussed above and below. Control firms are U.S.-domiciled U.S.-listed firms with available data in the 
Compustat and CRSP databases. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2 for Chinese and U.S.-domiciled firm-years. Panel A 
contains descriptive statistics and univariate tests15 of differences for our full sample of 302 firm-years. 
The 33.8 percent incidence of 302 IIC disclosures in the Chinese sample is four times the incidence for 
U.S. domestic 302 filers (p < 0.01). Chinese firms also exhibit significantly higher revenue growth, fewer 
business segments, lower inventory and less foreign income, fewer merger and acquisition and 
restructuring activities, as well as fewer prior-year losses and higher Altman (1968) Z-scores (where 
bankruptcy risk is lower as Z-score rises). Only 45.6 percent of Chinese U.S.-listed firms use Big-4 
auditors compared with 73.9 percent for U.S.-domiciled firms (p < 0.01). 
Descriptive statistics and univariate tests for the 404 subsample are provided in panel B (Table 2). 
The Chinese and U.S. firm-year observations decline by 52 and 20 percent, respectively, thus 
corroborating our design choice to examine both 302 and 404 disclosures. Among 404 filers, the Chinese 
U.S.-listed firm-year incidence of 404 IIC disclosures is five times that for domestic U.S.-listed firm-
years, a higher magnitude than the fourfold Chinese firm-year incidence of 302 IIC disclosures over its 
U.S. counterpart incidence in panel A. In general, the difference in the levels of control variables between 
the Chinese firm-years and U.S. firm-years remain generally significant.  
In panel C (Table 2), we compare CIPOs and CRMs. The incidence of CRM 302 IIC disclosures 
is three times that of CIPOs (p < 0.01), providing univariate support for H3. Our sample CIPO firm-years 
are on average more than eight times the size of CRMs when measured by MVE, but the magnitude of this 
difference is reduced by half when measured by total assets (both p < 0.01). Compared with CRMs, 
CIPOs have fewer business segments, less inventory, and higher incidences of M&A and 
RESTRUCTURE. RANKZ and GROWTH are not significantly different between the two groups. 
Importantly, 90 percent of CIPO firm-years have Big-4 auditors, compared to only 9 percent for CRMs. 
                                                     
15 For continuous variables, we perform t-tests; for indicator variables, we provide chi-square statistics. We also perform the non-
parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test (untabulated) which shows no difference to the t-tests in significance, except the Wilcoxon 
test significance level for BUSSEGS is p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 for panels B and C, respectively. 
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Pearson correlations for the 302 and 404 filer populations (untabulated16) show that there is no 
significant multicollinearity. In summary, the univariate tests in Table 2 indicate that Chinese U.S.-listed 
firms report more IICs (H1) and differ significantly in other regards from U.S.-domiciled firms. Further 
evident are within-group differences by listing method between CIPOs and CRMs, both in IIC reports 
(H3) and in firm characteristics. We examine IIC disclosures while controlling for differences in firm 
characteristics in the following section. 
***** Table 2 about here ***** 
5. MAIN RESULTS 
Ineffective Internal Control Differences (H1 and H3) 
We present tests of hypothesis H1 and H3 in Table 3 by estimating equation (1) with the full 
sample of 302 filers and 404 filers in columns (1)-(3), and with matched samples of 302 filers and 404 
filers in columns (4)-(6). The dependent variable is 302 for our entire sample in column (1) and is 302 and 
404 for the 404 filer subsample in columns (2) and (3), respectively. In Table 3 onward, by design, the 
degree of auditor influence on the IIC reporting generally increases from left to right, columns (1)–(3). 
Because column (1) includes all 302 filers, both accelerated 404 filers and non-accelerated filers not 
subject to 404 auditor attestation, its IIC reports are more likely to reflect management assessments of 
IICs. Column (2) reflects more auditor influence over IICs than column (1) because, for these 404 filers, 
their 302 assessments are subject to auditor review at fiscal year-end. Column (3) reflects the highest 
auditor influence since the dependent variable is auditor 404 IIC attestation. 
For hypothesis H1, Table 3 reveals positive coefficients for CIPO in all columns, and statistical 
significance (p < 0.01) for columns (1) and (3)17, thereby indicating that CIPO firms have a higher 
                                                     
16 All untabulated tests are available from the authors upon request. 
17 Tests in columns 2 and 5 tend to be weaker, perhaps because of a nexus of two conditions: first, they are on a population with 
larger firms, suggesting lower underlying IIC propensities, than in columns (1) and (4); second, columns (2) and (5) have a 
dependent variable with less auditor influence than columns (3) and (6). We have uncovered no other alternative explanations. 
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propensity to report IICs than their U.S. domiciled counterparts, after controlling for determinants of IICs. 
In columns (4)–(6), we present matched sample tests that help control for latent omitted variables, 
including those related to the self-selection of an exchange.18 Despite a smaller sample size, these results 
are similar to and sometimes larger than columns (1)–(3); the coefficients on CIPO monotonically 
increase in the matched sample (columns (4) to (6)). The magnitude of the propensity of CIPOs to report 
IICs increases in the matched sample for 404; the odds ratio for CIPO for 404 reporting for the full and 
matched samples are 2.45 and 5.06, respectively19. Thus, CIPOs are twice to five times more likely than 
U.S.-domiciled U.S.-listed firms to make 404 IIC disclosures. The coefficients on CRM are all 
significantly positive and monotonically increase from columns (1) to (3), (and (4) to (6) for the matched 
sample), suggesting higher IIC reporting as auditor influence on those reports strengthens. 
Control variables generally agree with ACK in terms of direction and significance, with the 
exception of RESTRUCTURE and M&A. Two likely reasons for these differences are: First, ACK’s 
setting is in the first year of SOX 302 implementation and thus may reflect unfamiliarity with its 
requirements and the internal controls it assesses. Second, ACK’s dependent variable was the less severe 
“IC deficiency” report. By comparison, our dependent variable is management’s overall report of IICs, 
and our setting is 2008–2012, which by design choice follows an initial learning period and release of 
clarifying implementation guidance in PCAOB Audit Standard No. 5, released in July of 2007, and 
should have been understood and adopted by manager and auditor IIC reporting for 2008 (PCAOB 2007). 
BIG4AUD is generally negative (significant for the full sample of 302 firm-years), in line with prior 
research indicating that Big-4 auditors incentivize client firms to implement stronger internal controls. A 
formal test of difference in coefficients for CIPO and CRM is also highly significant (p < 0.01) in all 
columns, thereby lending support to H3. 
                                                     
18 We do not employ a Heckman’s self-selection model because the selection model for choosing listing by reverse merger, 
constructed by Adjei et al. (2008) is likely to be different for Chinese firms and relies heavily on reported financials, the integrity 
of which is at the heart of our research questions. In our setting, a matched sample is a more appropriate method to control for 
immeasurable factors that may influence the listing choice.  
19 These odds ratios are consistent with the univariate measures of CIPO IIC propensities in Table 2 and Addendum 1 panel A. 
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Overall, the results in Table 3 indicate that CIPOs, as well as CRMs, have more IICs than U.S.-
domiciled U.S.-listed firms (H1), and CIPOs have a lower propensity to report IICs than CRMs (H3). 
Table 3 also provides suggestive evidence of under-reporting, in that coefficients for CIPO and CRM are 
higher when 404 (versus 302) is the dependent variable, suggesting increased IIC reporting as the auditor 
role in IIC reporting increases. Another implication of Table 3’s evidence that CIPOs have higher IIC 
propensities than U.S. domiciled counterparts is that CIPOs are not an appropriate control group for 
testing CRM financial reporting quality (e.g. Chen et al. 2016; Mao and Ettredge 2016). 
***** Table 3 about here ***** 
Under-reporting of IICs (H2 and H4) 
We next provide evidence on whether Chinese U.S.-listed firms under-report IICs more than 
U.S.-domiciled U.S.-listed counterparts. Table 4 presents results for tests of IIC under-reporting (H2 and 
H4) using a two-stage regression for our matched sample, and findings are qualitatively similar for the 
unmatched dataset. In the first stage estimation (untabulated), the results for matched firms exhibit 
substantively similar signs and significance as in Table 3, except BIG4AUD becomes consistently 
significantly negative (p < 0.01)20. Table 4 presents the results of the second-stage regressions, using the 
predicted IICs from the first stage as the dependent variable in estimations of equation (3) with the 
subsample of matched firms with clean IIC reports. Thus, the intercepts represent the average 
PREDICTED_IIC. Hypothesis H2 predicts positive coefficients on CIPO and CRM; estimates in columns 
(1)–(3) reveal that in the matched sample of 302 filers, CIPOs under-report 302 IICs (p < 0.01). CRM is 
positive and statistically significant in all three columns. Overall, the results in Table 4 lend support to 
H2. 
                                                     
20 Our likelihood ratios and Wald statistics for the first-stage compare favorably with ACK. Although pseudo-R-square statistics 
exist for logistic regression, they are not adequate measures model fit (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 2013). Our pseudo-R-
squares are equal or higher than those in other studies that use a prediction from a determinant model for a second-stage analysis 
(see for example Campa and Kedia (2002); Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2012); Fang, Maffett, and Zhang (2015)). 
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For H4 tests of differential under-reporting by CIPOs and CRMs, results differ for 302 and 404 
filers. For 302 filers, the magnitude of the under-reporting is not significantly different between CIPOs 
and CRMs; however, for the 404 filers, the coefficient for CIPO is significantly less than CRM, thereby 
supporting H4. Table 4 also helps confirm that the findings in Table 3 are not due to over-reporting. In 
untabulated results, we find further that under-reporting is not isolated to years before the heightened 
scrutiny period (2010-2012); rather, under-reporting is statistically significant in the scrutiny period 
despite the heightened attention. BIG4AUD is also significantly negative with a Big-4 auditor reducing 
PREDICTED_IIC by 12 to 20 percent on average, which we consider in the supplementary analysis 
section. 
The under-reporting of IICs by both CIPOs (for the 302 filer matched sample) and CRMs and the 
insignificant difference between their under-reporting for 302 disclosures may help explain why investors 
and regulators failed to distinguish “good apples” from “bad apples”, their resulting high stock price 
synchronicity, and remedial regulatory actions that failed to distinguish between them (Ang et al. 2014; 
Darrough et al. 2015) 
******* Table 4 about here ******* 
The Effect of Scrutiny on IIC Reporting 
We next examine as a corroborative test of H1 and H2 the effect of heightened media and 
regulatory scrutiny of Chinese U.S.-listed firms in 2010-2012. Notwithstanding possible perceptions of 
low enforcement risk among Chinese U.S. listers, prior findings indicate public scrutiny promotes 
corporate governance and disclosure (Abrahamson and Park 1994; Yue, Richardson, and Thornton 1997; 
Bednar, Boivie, and Prince 2013). Particularly relevant to this study is Rice and Weber (2012), who 
investigate 404 reporting for a set of firms with restatements related to internal control material 
weaknesses (hereafter, ICMWs), which are reported as part of the internal control audit. Rice et al. find 
that firms with prior accounting problems or poor financial health are more likely to report 404 ICMWs, 
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which they interpret as increased reporting by a subset of firms subjected to additional scrutiny, but they 
do not separately examine Chinese U.S.-listed firms. 
Chinese U.S.-listed firms experienced higher scrutiny starting the summer of 2010. On June 28, 
2010, Muddy Waters released the first of several reports on Orient Paper Inc. (NYSE ONP), with a strong 
sell recommendation warning of significant revenue and asset overstatement and misappropriation of 
raised capital (Block and Regan 2010). Within weeks, the PCAOB signaled its concerns regarding 
Chinese U.S.-listed firms in a Staff Audit Practice Alert, leading to a wave of 60 fraud allegations for 
CRMs21 and further regulatory scrutiny (PCAOB 2011; SEC 2011). The advent of intense scrutiny of the 
financial reporting practices of Chinese U.S.-listed firms by the media and regulators for the period 2010–
2012 provides a unique intervention, facilitated by comparisons of SOX 302 and 404 disclosures, to apply 
difference-in-difference comparisons to address whether heightened scrutiny is an alternative explanation 
for test results for H1 in Table 3. Differential reporting pre- and post- scrutiny can also provide insight 
regarding under-reporting results for H2. Following Darrough et al., who test for stock market spillover 
effects among Chinese U.S. listers during this increased scrutiny period, we add to equation (1) a 
SCRUTINY indicator for the years 2010–2012 and its interaction with CIPO and CRM: 
302 / 404 =  β0 + β1CIPO + β2CRM + β3USIPO + β4USRM + β5GROWTH + β6BUSSEGS   (4) 
+ β7M&A + β8RESTRUCTURE + β9BIG4AUD + β10LNASSETS + β11RANKZ   
+ β12LOSS + β13SCRUTINY + β14CIPOxSCRUTINY  
+ β15CRMxSCRUTINY + ε  
Results are presented in Table 5. If the interaction term CIPOxSCRUTINY from equation (4) is 
positive and statistically significant, for 302 and 404, this indicates either more truthful reporting in later 
years or over-reporting in later years. In column (1), the CIPOxSCRUTINY coefficient is significant and 
positive (p < 0.05) while CIPO is insignificant. In column (3), with 404 as the dependent variable, the 
                                                     
21 As identified by Darrough et al. (2015), comprised of CRMs subject to SEC enforcement actions, class-action lawsuits, or 
media-reported fraud allegations. 
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interaction is no longer significant, and CIPO is positive and significant (p < 0.01). CRMxSCRUTINY 
shows a decreasing pattern from columns (1) to (3), with the scrutiny effect being strongest in 302 reports 
for 302 filer population (p < 0.01), and both significance and coefficient size dropping from columns (1) 
to (3). The coefficient on CRM is positive and significant (all p < 0.01), and monotonically increasing 
from column (1) to (3). Taken together, the regressions reported in Table 5 provide evidence that the 
managements of both CIPOs and CRMs responded to regulatory and media scrutiny by reporting more 
IICs; whereas CIPO 404 IIC auditor attestation was little affected, CRM 404 reports also increased in the 
period of scrutiny. These results are not consistent with an over-reporting explanation for our findings in 
Table 3; rather, they are consistent with CIPO managers and CRM managers and auditors under-reporting 
IICs before 2010 when there was less scrutiny. The negative, significant coefficient on SCRUTINY is 
consistent with a general time-trend of reduced IIC reporting for all filers (Ye, Hermanson, and Krishnan 
2013). 
******* Table 5 about here ******* 
Thus, results in Tables 4 and 5 for the scrutiny period serve to corroborate prior evidence that 
Chinese U.S.-listed firms under-report IICs, particularly 302 IICs and CRMs. The 302 under-reporting 
indicated in Tables 4 and 5 further suggests that the 404 exemption may have led to less diligent financial 
reporting, at least for Chinese U.S. listers. 
6. SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS 
Chinese U.S.-listed Firm Auditors  
We next provide corroborative descriptive evidence comparing CIPO and CRM auditors. Table 6 
presents the signing auditors’ engagement frequencies and total fees of Chinese U.S.-listed firms during 
our study period. In panel A, the Big 4 (in bold) dominate the CIPO audit market, accounting for 90 
percent of the engagements and 98 percent of the fees in our sample. In panel B, CRM auditors and fees 
differ starkly, as only 9 percent of CRMs have Big-4 auditors, and Ernst & Young LLP and 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC rank below the top-15 CRM auditors by the number of engagements. Big4 
auditors represent 26 percent of CRM fees, consistent with auditing more complex and/or larger CRM 
clients. This evidence of Big-4 audit differences between CIPOs and CRMs is consistent with prior 
findings that Big-4 auditors are associated with stronger internal controls22 and of lower IIC reporting and 
under-reporting for CIPOs versus CRMs. 
******* Table 6 about here ******* 
Internal Control Material Weakness Types 
In untabulated results, we further examine differences in ICMW types. When an IIC is reported, 
management or the auditor (for 302 and 404, respectively) is required to disclose what material 
weakness(es) triggered the filing (SEC 2003), which are codified into over 80 discrete types by 
AuditAnalyticsTM. Univariate tests of differences between CIPOs, CRMs and their matched U.S. 
counterparts reveal significant differences between CIPOs, CRMs and their matched U.S. domestic 
counterparts. In particular, a strong tendency is indicated for Chinese U.S.-listed firms to report ICMW 
types that relate to general financial reporting quality (codes 40, 50, and 68) and personnel and 
segregation of duties (code 51) for both CIPO and CRMs. Prior research shows that such company-level 
ICMWs are associated with less remediation (Johnstone, Li, and Rupley 2011), lower accruals quality 
(Doyle et al. 2007b) and more negative stock market reactions (Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare 
2008). Consistent with our findings for H3, CRMs report more types of ICMW than CIPOs—notably, 
accounts receivable issues (code 15) and related party issues (code 38), both of which suggest tunneling 
via related parties.23 Importantly, revenue recognition issues are not significantly different between 
Chinese firms and their U.S. matched counterparts in 302 or 404 ICMWs, suggesting that classical 
                                                     
22 We thank a reviewer for pointing out that our findings do not address the direction of causality; it is possible that Big 4 auditors 
choose clients with strong internal controls. 
23 These additional codes become insignificant for the 404 population, which is likely a combination of the association between 
internal control weakness and firm size, and the reduction in sample size. Tests on all ICMW types between CIPOs, CRMs, and 
their matched counterparts are available from the authors on request. 
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earnings management problems may not be a dominant financial reporting issue among Chinese U.S.-
listed firms compared with U.S.-domiciled counterparts, and that internal controls may serve as an apt and 
more applicable measure of financial reporting quality for Chinese U.S.-listed firms than accrual-based 
measures. CIPOs have significantly fewer restatements in amongst both 302 and 404 filers, and the 
percentage of CRMs restating is nominally higher but not statistically significant. The significantly higher 
ICMWs coupled with the significantly lower restatements for CIPOs suggest that restatements may not be 
an appropriate measure to capture under-reporting of IICs as used in Mao and Ettredge (2016). 
Robustness Checks 
To ensure that our results are robust to sample selection, measurement, and estimation choices, 
we perform several sensitivity checks. When we reduce the required minimum revenue from $20 million 
to $10 million, include dual-listed Chinese firms and other omitted Chinese firm observations (as detailed 
in Table 1), and omit firms trading OTC and on pink sheets, our results are qualitatively similar. CIPO 
becomes significant in Table 4 in all columns when we examine only firms on major exchanges. 
Our results also are not sensitive to our implementation of the ACK discovery model in three 
regards. First, our findings are similar when we use three-year measures as in ACK, even though the 
sample size is reduced. Second, our results are not sensitive to the use of alternate measures for ACK 
controls, such as if we dichotomize M&A and RESTRUCTURE equal to 1 if greater than 1 or 5 percent of 
total assets. Third, ACK do not include a Big-4 auditor measure in their discovery model. Although we 
assert that BIG4AUD may affect both the discovery of IICs and their under-reporting, our results are 
qualitatively unchanged when we remove BIG4AUD from our discovery models (equations (1)-(3)). 
As noted in Section 3, we perform an alternate match using MVE for size and find slightly 
attenuated but qualitatively similar results. For our under-reporting analysis, we have listing controls in 
the second stage. When we include them in the first stage, the results are also substantively similar. When 
we estimate the under-reporting analysis on the full sample of 302 and subsample of 404 firm-years, the 
results are qualitatively similar, except CIPO becomes significant for the regressions for 404 filers. While 
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clustering standard errors is contraindicated for logistic regression, as a further check, we perform a linear 
probability model, clustering by firm (and by firm-year) and the results are consistent with our tabulated 
logistic regressions. 
7. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Whereas CRMs have dominated prior media, regulator and research attention, CRMs have 
effectively ceased, leaving CIPOs the relevant remaining class of Chinese firms on U.S. exchanges. Yet 
little prior evidence exists regarding the internal controls underlying the financial reporting quality of this 
sole remaining class of Chinese U.S.-listed firms. This study examines 302 and 404 ineffective internal 
control and related disclosures to document the internal controls of CIPOs that underlie their financial 
reporting quality, with three main findings. First, both CIPOs and CRMs report significantly more IICs 
than U.S.-domiciled counterparts. Second, both CIPOs and CRMs under-report IICs to a greater degree 
than U.S.-domiciled counterparts, with CIPO under-reporting only for 302 disclosures. Third, CIPOs 
report and under-report IICs significantly less than CRMs. Corroborative evidence of differences between 
CIPOs and CRMs is provided by their auditors and by reporting responses during a period of heightened 
media and regulatory scrutiny. 
These results both extend and reinterpret prior research. Specifically, the higher IIC reporting and 
under-reporting of both CIPOs and CRMs compared with U.S.-domiciled U.S.-listed firms suggest a 
partial pooling equilibrium wherein it was difficult for investors to distinguish between firms with strong 
versus weak financial reporting systems among Chinese U.S.-listed equities, which could help explain the 
stock spillover effects in Darrough et al. (2015). This partial pooling may have been a key reason for the 
survival and uplisting findings of Lee et al. (2015). Our finding of a higher likelihood of IICs for CRMs 
also informs interpretations of performance measures such as ROA since the integrity of financial 
measures relies on internal controls. Our evidence of higher IIC reporting and under-reporting by CRMs, 
in particular, may help explain Lee et al.’s finding of increasing auditor adverse opinions for CRMs over 
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the three years following listings. Lee et al. further find CRMs to have fewer adverse audit opinions than 
USRMs in their first year of listing, a difference that weakens and disappears within three years, 
consistent with IIC weaknesses, and the under-reporting of them, undermining auditors’ short-term ability 
to discern going concern risk.24 Our findings extend the findings of Chen et al. (2016) and Lee et al. by 
moving the conversation of Chinese U.S.-listed firms beyond CRMs, and highlighting CIPOs as a 
significant class of foreign U.S. listers. Chen et al. emphasize the reverse merger listing method as 
evidence of weak bonding, which they view as a major explanation for CRM financial reporting issues. 
While we agree that bonding is a likely partial explanation, we also provide evidence supportive of what 
they call a “China effect”, i.e. a broad issue with internal control compliance, consistent with specific 
cultural behavior relevant to the implementation of internal control systems and attendant IIC disclosures. 
Our findings of higher reporting and under-reporting of IICs for both CIPOs and CRMs compared 
with U.S. domiciled firms, along with ICMW restatement propensities discussed in section 6, reinterpret 
findings in Mao and Ettredge (2016). While Mao and Ettredge fail to find lower 302 reporting for CRMs 
before restatements, their test is not well specified for testing under-reporting for two reasons. First 
restatements are a biased measure of weak internal controls in this setting because CRMs are likely to 
restate less than is warranted, given our findings of higher propensity to report IICs and no significant 
higher restating in our ICMW analysis combined with Srinivasan et al.’s (2014) finding of opportunistic 
under-reporting of restatements by foreign U.S.-listers, especially from weak rule of law countries. 
Second, CRMs have a four-fold higher likelihood to report IICs, making a 302 report mechanically more 
likely for any CRM, let alone one that is likely to restate.  
Our findings regarding IIC reporting and under-reporting among 404-exempt filers complements 
those of Holder, Karim, and Robin (2012) and qualifies the findings of Kinney and Shepardson (2011), 
                                                     
 
24 Further, our sample selection highlights a key issue of Lee et al.’s design choice of CRM and USRM comparisons, with 52 
percent of USRM firm-years not meeting our $20 million revenue threshold. Summary statistics in their Table 2, panel B confirm 
that CRMs are compared to very small risky USRM firms that differ significantly from CRMs in every control variable prior to 
their performance comparison period. 
  
27 
suggesting a review of the 404 exemption for non-accelerated foreign filers is appropriate, and continuing 
regulatory monitoring and enforcement as pledged by the SEC (White 2013; Ceresney 2015). Despite an 
initial inclination for Chinese firms to de-list or go private in response to U.S. media and regulatory 
scrutiny in 2010-2012 (Hansen and Öqvist 2013), Chinese company U.S. IPOs have rebounded in recent 
years (Shih 2015), and Chinese firms have increasingly listed on Chinese exchanges via reverse mergers 
(Ren 2016). Given China’s recent stock market history, related regulatory interventions, IPO and foreign 
listing incentives (Areddy 2015; Chen and Zhang 2017), the financial reporting quality and underlying 
internal controls Chinese listed firms continue to be a priority for regulators, investors, and other market 
stakeholders globally, including in China. 
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Appendix    
 
Sample selection 
 
CIPO and USIPO firm data for the period 2000–2012 were obtained from the Thomson Reuters 
SDC IPO database™, where the primary exchange nation was the U.S. and the domicile nation was China 
or the U.S., respectively. We use Macquarie Capital Services Chinese dual-listed firm report (Gillis and 
Lynch 2012) and manually reviewed SEC filings to classify each SDC Chinese IPO (via direct listing or 
American Deposit Receipts, referring to both methods as IPO) as solely listed in the U.S. (CIPO) or as 
dual-listed elsewhere. This process yielded 12 dual-listed firms and 128 CIPOs. We further verified 
country of operations through manually checking SEC filings and categorized firm-years accordingly. 
The CRM sample derives primarily from a search of shell reverse merger transactions in 
PrivateRaise™, the most comprehensive vendor of reverse merger data, with comprehensive coverage 
since 2008 and selective coverage for the period 1999–2007. PrivateRaise’s “nation” variable indicates 
where the majority of the operations were located at the time of the reverse merger. Using this variable, 
we identified 442 CRMs and 708 USRMs. We use Thomson Reuter’s SDC International Merger database 
(SDC)™ and a Bloomberg listing of CRMs to ensure more complete identification; there was a high 
degree of overlap, but this step further identified 13 and 14 CRMs using SDC and Bloomberg, 
respectively (Gammeltoft 2011). Following Lee et al. (2015) and Darrough et al. (2015), our CRM 
sample is limited to reverse mergers completed during 2000–2012 for three reasons: First, CRMs were 
few but increasing before 2004 (Chen et al. 2016; Darrough et al. 2015). Second, PrivateRaise’s coverage 
is sparse before 2000. Third, reverse merger effects may not be time-invariant; that is, the listing effect 
might fade over time due to survivorship bias and corporate evolution. As a final step to enhance 
inclusiveness, we further considered Compustat’s LOC code. Because the LOC code is scalar, we 
manually checked each identified firm’s SEC filings to determine if they had Chinese operations during 
our study period (2008–2012). This final step added seven and eleven firms to our CIPO and CRM 
samples, respectively. 
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Appendix (continued) 
 
Variable definitions 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
302 = Indicator equal to 1 if a 302 report of IIC is reported in at least one quarter of 
the year, and 0 otherwise. 
404 = Indicator equal to 1 if a 404(b) report of IIC is reported, and 0 otherwise. 
UNDERREPORT_IIC = Residual of estimated probability of 302/404=1 from equation (5) for firms 
with 302/404 = 0. 
  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
CHINA = Indicator equal to 1 if a Chinese U.S.-listed firm, and 0 otherwise. 
IPO = Indicator equal to 1 if became listed through an initial public offering in 2000 
or later, and 0 otherwise. 
RM = Indicator equal to 1 if became listed through a reverse merger in 2000 or 
later, and 0 otherwise. 
CIPO = Indicator equal to 1 if a Chinese U.S.-listed firm listed through an initial 
public offering in 2000 or later, and 0 otherwise. 
CRM = Indicator equal to 1 if a Chinese U.S.-listed firm listed through a reverse 
merger in 2000 or later, and 0 otherwise. 
USIPO = Indicator equal to 1 if a domestic firm listed through an initial public offering 
in 2000 or later, and 0 otherwise. 
USRM = Indicator equal to 1 if a domestic firm listed through a reverse merger in 
2000 or later, and 0 otherwise. 
REV%CHG = Percentage change in total revenue from the prior year. 
RANKGROWTH = Decile rank of REV%CHG. 
BUSSEGS = Number of total business segments. 
FOREIGNSALES = Indicator equal to 1 if the firm reported foreign revenue, and 0 otherwise. 
RESTRUCTURE = Indicator equal to 1 if the firm reported restructuring charges, and 0 
otherwise. 
M&A = Indicator equal to 1 if the firm an acquisition, and 0 otherwise. 
BIG4AUD = Indicator equal to 1 if the auditor was Deloitte & Touch LLP, Ernst & Young 
LLP, KPMG LLP, or PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and 0 otherwise. 
INVENTORY = End of year total inventory scaled by the end of year total assets. 
LNMARKETVAL = Natural logarithm of the end of year market value of equity. 
ALTMANZ = Index of bankruptcy risk as defined in Altman (1968). 
RANKZ = Decile rank of ALTMANZ. 
LOSS = Indicator equal to 1 if the firm reported a negative income, and 0 otherwise. 
SCRUTINY = Indicator equal to 1 if the fiscal year was 2010 through 2012, and 0 
otherwise. 
LITIGATION = Indicator equal to 1 if in a litigious industry (SIC code within 2833-2836, 
3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370) and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1   Sample composition 
       Panel A: Sample firm identification (see Appendix for sample selection method) 
 
Chinese       
IPO US IPO 
Chinese 
Reverse 
Merger 
U.S. 
Reverse 
Merger 
  DealFlow 
  
442  708  
  Added from SDC 128  1,911  14  
   Added from Bloomberg 
  
14  
   Added from Compustat 7  
 
11  
   
Total sample firms identified 135  1,911  481  708  
  
       Panel B: Sample firm-year composition 
    
 
Chinese       
IPO US IPO 
Chinese 
Reverse 
Merger 
U.S. 
Reverse 
Merger 
Other 
Available 
Firm 
Years 
Total 
Firm 
Years 
Compustat firm-years  
(2008-2012) 459  4,229  696  410  28,352  34,146  
Less: 
      Firm-years with missing  
Audit Analytics data (19) (128) (40) (29) (7,322) (7,538) 
Firm-years with missing 
Compustat data (15) (1,130) (104) (143) (6,554) (7,946) 
Firm-years with  
Revenue < $20M (26) (379) (101) (213) (3,327) (4,046) 
Financial firm-years  
(SIC code 6000-6999) (25) (151) (3) 0  (284) (463) 
Other deleted firm-years1 0  0  0  0  (112) (112) 
Sample firm-years 374  2,441  448  25  10,753  14,041  
       Sample firms  
with available data 111  692  144  15  3,234  3,607  
 
1 "Other deleted firm-years" is comprised of 58 Chinese dual-listed firm-years wherein the U.S. listing is not the 
primary listing, 21 Chinese other firm-years, and firm-years for firms listed in avenues other than NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ, OTC, or pink sheets. 
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Table 2   Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
 
Panel A: Firm-years for 302 filers  
(n=822 Chinese firm-years and 13,219 U.S. firm-years) 
  
Panel B: Firm-years for 404 filers  
(n=393 Chinese firm-years and 10,641, U.S. firm-years) 
 
      
Tests of 
Differences         
 
      
Tests of 
Differences         
    Mean T Chi Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
 
    Mean T Chi Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
302 REPORT OF IIC             
 
404 REPORT OF IIC             
Chinese firm-years 0.338 
 
***        0.473  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Chinese firm-years 0.188 
 
***        0.391  0.000 0.000 0.000 
U.S. firm-years 0.083            0.276  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.037            0.188  0.000 0.000 0.000 
RANKGROWTH               
 
RANKGROWTH               
Chinese firm-years 6.122 *** 
 
       3.245  4.000 8.000 9.000 
 
Chinese firm-years 6.260 *** 
 
       3.095  4.000 8.000 9.000 
U.S. firm-years 4.400            2.816  2.000 4.000 7.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 4.453            2.739  2.000 4.000 7.000 
BUSSEGS                 
 
BUSSEGS                 
Chinese firm-years 1.786 *** 
 
       1.349  1.000 1.000 3.000 
 
Chinese firm-years 1.819 *** 
 
       1.306  1.000 1.000 3.000 
U.S. firm-years 2.042            1.584  1.000 1.000 3.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 2.109            1.653  1.000 1.000 3.000 
INVENTORY                 
 
INVENTORY                 
Chinese firm-years 0.079 *** 
 
       0.093  0.004 0.049 0.128 
 
Chinese firm-years 0.062 *** 
 
       0.088  0.000 0.023 0.093 
U.S. firm-years 0.112            0.125  0.008 0.073 0.173 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.101            0.112  0.008 0.068 0.158 
MVEa                 
 
MVEa                 
Chinese firm-years 554.4 *** 
 
    2,362.7  45.1 130.8 377.6 
 
Chinese firm-years 1,004.6 *** 
 
3,347.0 143.4 303.5 787.3 
U.S. firm-years 3,291.2         9,177.5  117.6 504.2 1,999.7 
 
U.S. firm-years 4,260.9     11,486.1 259.2 791.8 2,731.3 
ASSETSa 
       
  
 
ASSETSa 
       
  
Chinese firm-years 450.1 *** 
 
      746.2  103.4 201.1 447.9 
 
Chinese firm-years 734.7 *** 
 
964.3 215.9 396.6 822.5 
U.S. firm-years 3,605.7         9,174.6  153.4 557.7 2,319.3 
 
U.S. firm-years 4,521.7     10,564.3 300.9 890.3 3,209.4 
RANKZ                 
 
RANKZ                 
Chinese firm-years 5.704 *** 
 
       2.426  4.000 6.000 8.000 
 
Chinese firm-years 5.875 *** 
 
       2.402  4.000 6.000 8.000 
U.S. firm-years 
 
5.014 
  
       2.462  3.000 5.000 7.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 
 
5.172 
  
       2.383  3.000 5.000 7.000 
FOREIGNSALES               
 
FOREIGNSALES               
Chinese firm-years 0.313 
 
***        0.464  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Chinese firm-years 0.382 
 
***        0.486  0.000 0.000 1.000 
U.S. firm-years   0.553            0.497  0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
U.S. firm-years   0.597            0.491  0.000 1.000 1.000 
RESTRUCTURE 
   
  
   
  
 
RESTRUCTURE 
       
  
Chinese firm-years 0.017 
 
***       0.129  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Chinese firm-years 0.023 
 
***       0.150  0.000 0.000 0.000 
U.S. firm-years 0.349            0.477  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.388            0.487  0.000 0.000 1.000 
M&A                 
 
M&A                 
Chinese firm-years 0.298 
 
***        0.458  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Chinese firm-years 0.422 
  
       0.495  0.000 0.000 1.000 
U.S. firm-years 0.398            0.489  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.443            0.497  0.000 0.000 1.000 
BIG4AUD       
 
        
 
BIG4AUD                 
Chinese firm-years 0.456 
 
***        0.498  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Chinese firm-years 0.751 
 
***        0.433  1.000 1.000 1.000 
U.S. firm-years 0.739            0.439  0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.850            0.357  1.000 1.000 1.000 
LOSS                 
 
LOSS                 
Chinese firm-years 0.265 
 
***        0.442  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Chinese firm-years 0.272 
  
       0.446  0.000 0.000 1.000 
U.S. firm-years 0.317            0.465  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.271            0.445  0.000 0.000 1.000 
aWinsorized, in millions. T and Chi are a t-test of difference in means and a chi-square test significance, respectively. Symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percent or less. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel C: CIPO and CRM firm-years  
(374 Chinese firm-years and 448 U.S. firm-years) 
      Tests of Differences         
    Mean T Chi Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
302 REPORT OF IIC             
CIPO firm-years            0.155  
 
***        0.362  0.000 0.000  0.000 
CRM firm-years            0.491             0.500  0.000 0.000  1.000 
GROWTH                 
CIPO firm-years            6.115  
  
       3.223  4.000       8.000  9.000 
CRM firm-years            6.127             3.267  4.000       8.000  9.000 
BUSSEGS                 
CIPO firm-years            1.660  ** 
 
       1.181  1.000       1.000  2.000 
CRM firm-years            1.891             1.468  1.000       1.000  3.000 
INVENTORY               
CIPO firm-years            0.049  *** 
 
       0.073  0.000       0.012  0.079 
CRM firm-years            0.104             0.101  0.023       0.078  0.155 
MVEa                 
CIPO firm-years         1,069.3  *** 
 
    3,431.2  114.8       321.6  1,042.2 
CRM firm-years            124.5             146.3  28.7         68.0  161.3 
ASSETSa 
       
  
CIPO firm-years           740.7  *** 
 
       986.8  198.7      374.0  863.4 
CRM firm-years 
 
           207.4             283.4  72.9       126.8  235.0 
RANK-Z                
CIPO firm-years            5.770  
  
2.479  4.000 6.000  8.000 
CRM firm-years 
 
           5.650  
  
2.383  4.000 6.000  8.000 
FOREIGN                
CIPO firm-years            0.369  
 
*** 0.483  0.000 0.000  1.000 
CRM firm-years              0.266      0.442  0.000 0.000  1.000 
RESTRUCTURE 
       
  
CIPO firm-years           0.032  
 
*** 0.176  0.000 0.000  0.000 
CRM firm-years            0.004      0.067  0.000 0.000  0.000 
M&A                 
CIPO firm-years            0.433  
 
*** 0.496  0.000 0.000  1.000 
CRM firm-years            0.185      0.389  0.000 0.000  0.000 
BIG4AUD                 
CIPO firm-years            0.898  
 
*** 0.303  1.000 1.000  1.000 
CRM firm-years            0.087      0.282  0.000 0.000  0.000 
LOSS                 
CIPO firm-years            0.313  
 
*** 0.464  0.000 0.000  1.000 
CRM firm-years            0.225      0.418  0.000 0.000  0.000 
 
  
38 
Table 3   Logistic regression tests of IIC differences 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Population 302 Filers 404 Filers 302 Filers 404 Filers 
Dependent 
variable 
302 302 404 302 302 404 
       
CIPO (H1) 0.831*** 0.344 0.896*** 0.555** 0.742* 1.622*** 
 (0.160) (0.240) (0.260) (0.238) (0.431) (0.540) 
CRM (H1) 1.924*** 2.135*** 2.424*** 1.772*** 2.215*** 2.753*** 
 (0.123) (0.217) (0.233) (0.195) (0.436) (0.537) 
USIPO -0.094 0.031 -0.015 -0.744** -0.724 -0.642 
 (0.090) (0.103) (0.134) (0.352) (0.594) (0.806) 
USRM 0.487 -0.179 0.175    
 (0.461) (1.166) (1.246)    
RANKGROWT
H 
0.035*** -0.002 0.024 0.051** -0.031 -0.017 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.043) (0.048) 
BUSSEGS 0.029 0.049* 0.072** 0.068 0.294*** 0.267*** 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.035) (0.049) (0.091) (0.096) 
FOREIGNSALE
S 
0.099 0.056 -0.017 -0.183 -0.523* -0.578* 
 (0.070) (0.092) (0.115) (0.149) (0.276) (0.306) 
RESTRUCTURE 0.027 0.036 0.090 0.000 0.400 0.943* 
 (0.077) (0.094) (0.121) (0.240) (0.409) (0.506) 
M&A -0.061 -0.065 0.036 -0.145 -0.888*** -0.433 
 (0.071) (0.087) (0.111) (0.161) (0.302) (0.317) 
BIG4AUD -0.269*** -0.211** -0.310** -0.158 -0.097 -0.288 
 (0.084) (0.105) (0.130) (0.200) (0.357) (0.397) 
INVENTORY 0.202 1.609*** 1.163* 0.669 2.751** 2.180 
 (0.327) (0.506) (0.641) (0.646) (1.284) (1.452) 
LNASSETS -0.190*** -0.263*** -0.317*** -0.081 -0.219 -0.276 
 (0.026) (0.036) (0.047) (0.077) (0.152) (0.169) 
RANKZ -0.094*** -0.096*** -0.117*** -0.137*** -0.243*** -0.181** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) (0.033) (0.065) (0.071) 
LOSS 0.535*** 0.624*** 0.564*** 0.462*** 0.343 0.233 
 (0.075) (0.096) (0.123) (0.175) (0.334) (0.369) 
Constant -1.021*** -1.285** -1.950*** -1.339** -0.727 -1.315 
 (0.380) (0.522) (0.606) (0.521) (1.142) (1.284) 
       
CIPO = CRM 
(H3) 
31.56*** 32.08*** 20.45*** 27.28*** 11.89*** 6.199** 
       
Observations 14,041 11,034 11,034 1,580 750 750 
Exchange 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry 
dummies 
YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Likelihood ratio, 
χ2 
1242.3*** 589.7*** 487.5*** 296.2*** 159.2*** 131.1*** 
Wald, χ2 1024.5*** 466.8*** 427.1*** 232.9*** 109.0*** 93.5*** 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.138 0.106 0.126 0.174 0.267 0.257 
 
Logistic regressions of equation (1) on different samples with the dependent variable 302 in columns 
(1), (2), (4), and (5); the dependent variable is 404 for columns (3) and (6). The samples are as follows: 
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column (1) is our full sample; columns (2) and (3) are the sub-sample of 404 filers; column (4) 
includes all CIPOs and CRMs and their matched firms; and columns (5) and (6) are all 404 filing 
CIPOs and CRMs and their matched firms. Significance tests are Wald Chi-square tests except for 
CIPO=CRM, which presents the F-statistic for a Wald test of equal coefficients. Symbols ***, **, * 
indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent or less. Exchange indicators are NASDAQ, OTC, and 
PINK (intercept contains NYSE/AMEX). Fama-French 48 industry indicators are included and are 
individually dropped in the case of perfect multicollinearity. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix.  
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Table 4   Under-reporting of IICs, subsample of Chinese U.S.-listed firms and their matches  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Population 302 Filers 404 Filers 
Dependent variable for each column is 
UNDERREPORT_IIC 
 
302 
 
302 
 
404 
    
CIPO (H2) 0.032*** -0.001 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
CRM (H2) 0.033*** 0.039* 0.053*** 
 (0.009) (0.022) (0.017) 
USIPO 0.024*** 0.019 0.015 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) 
BIG4AUD -0.196*** -0.133*** -0.121*** 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.015) 
LITIGATION -0.010** -0.020** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Constant 0.309*** 0.225*** 0.194*** 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.015) 
    
CIPO = CRM (H4) 0.0125 3.485* 8.903*** 
    
Observations 1,219 648 670 
R-squared 0.575 0.254 0.362 
 
Ordinary least squares estimations of equation (3) on the subsample of CRM and CIPOs and 
their matches that did not disclose an IIC, with robust standard errors reported below the 
coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is a prediction of the existence an IIC from 
equation (2) (the estimation of equation (2) is provided in Addendum 3). Column (1) includes 
all CIPOs and CRMs and their matched firms who report a clean 302 report; and columns (2) 
and (3) are the 404 filers from the 404 matched sample who report a clean 302 and 404 report, 
respectively. Significance based on t-statistics are presented except for CIPO=CRM, which 
presents the F-statistic for a Wald test of equal coefficients. Symbols ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent or less. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.  
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Table 5   Effect of scrutiny on reporting of IICs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Population 302 Filers 404 Filers 
Dependent variable 302 302 404 
    
CIPO 0.343 0.280 1.060*** 
 (0.302) (0.372) (0.384) 
CRM 1.244*** 1.611*** 1.997*** 
 (0.178) (0.314) (0.335) 
USIPO -0.078 0.050 -0.018 
 (0.090) (0.103) (0.134) 
USRM 0.542 -0.128 0.147 
 (0.465) (1.198) (1.251) 
SCRUTINY -0.300*** -0.298*** -0.002 
 (0.066) (0.083) (0.108) 
CIPOxSCRUTINY 0.750** 0.157 -0.278 
 (0.344) (0.464) (0.484) 
CRMxSCRUTINY 1.180*** 0.950** 0.733* 
 (0.216) (0.391) (0.405) 
RANKGROWTH 0.038*** -0.001 0.026 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) 
BUSSEGS 0.028 0.048* 0.072** 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.035) 
FOREIGNSALES 0.107 0.071 -0.020 
 (0.070) (0.092) (0.115) 
RESTRUCTURE 0.022 0.023 0.092 
 (0.078) (0.094) (0.121) 
M&A -0.059 -0.065 0.034 
 (0.072) (0.087) (0.111) 
BIG4AUD -0.266*** -0.218** -0.312** 
 (0.084) (0.106) (0.130) 
INVENTORY 0.214 1.606*** 1.168* 
 (0.328) (0.506) (0.641) 
LNASSETS -0.192*** -0.258*** -0.318*** 
 (0.027) (0.036) (0.047) 
RANKZ -0.091*** -0.100*** -0.116*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) 
LOSS 0.510*** 0.582*** 0.568*** 
 (0.076) (0.097) (0.124) 
Constant -0.875** -1.088** -1.906*** 
 (0.384) (0.519) (0.605) 
    
Observations 14,041 11,034 11,034 
Exchange/Industry dummies YES/YES YES/YES YES/YES 
Likelihood ratio, χ2 1283.5*** 605.8*** 491.3*** 
Wald, χ2 1050.7*** 481.4*** 432.0*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.146 0.115 0.130 
 
Logistic regressions of equation (4). The sample for column (1) is our full sample of 
302 filers; columns (2) and (3) are the sub-sample of 404 filers. Significance tests are 
Wald Chi-square tests except for CIPOxSCRUTINY= CRMxSCRUTINY, which is the 
F-statistic for a Wald test of equal coefficients. Symbols ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent or less. Exchange indicators are NASDAQ, OTC, 
and PINK. Fama-French 48 industry indicators are included and are individually 
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dropped in the case of perfect multicollinearity. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix.
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Table 6   Auditors of Chinese U.S.-listed firms 
Panel A: Chinese IPO firm-years (n=374) 
     
 
Count  
Auditor name Freq % Freq  
Fee  
Auditor name 
Average fee 
per Audit  
(in $1,000) 
Total fees 
(in $1,000) 
% of 
total fees 
1 Deloitte & Touche LLP 153 40.9% 1 Deloitte & Touche LLP     1,066.0   163,099.5  41.4% 
2 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 84 22.5% 2 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP     1,428.3   119,973.4  30.4% 
3 Ernst & Young LLP 59 15.8% 3 Ernst & Young LLP        918.8      54,209.1  13.8% 
4 KPMG LLP 41 11.0% 4 KPMG LLP     1,173.8      48,125.3  12.2% 
5 GHP Horwath PC 6 1.6% 5 GHP Horwath PC          214.3          1,286.0  0.3% 
6 Kabani & Company Inc 5 1.3% 6 BDO China Dahua CPA Co Ltd          622.5          1,245.0  0.3% 
7 Grant Thornton LLP 4 1.1% 7 Grant Thornton LLP          284.6          1,138.5  0.3% 
8 Friedman LLP 3 0.8% 8 BDO China Shu Lun Pan CPAs LLP          418.3             836.6  0.2% 
8 Crowe Horwath LLP 3 0.8% 9 Kabani & Company Inc          142.6             713.0  0.2% 
9 Sherb & Co LLP 2 0.5% 10 BDO China Li Xin Da Hua CPA Co Ltd          270.0             540.0  0.1% 
9 BDO China Li Xin Da Hua CPA Co Ltd 2 0.5% 11 Friedman LLP          178.3             535.0  0.1% 
9 Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk LLP 2 0.5% 12 Crowe Horwath LLP          178.0             534.0  0.1% 
9 BDO China Shu Lun Pan CPAs LLP 2 0.5% 13 Stonefield Josephson Inc          510.9             510.9  0.1% 
9 BDO China Dahua CPA Co Ltd 2 0.5% 14 Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk LLP          185.0             370.0  0.1% 
 
Panel B: Chinese reverse merger firm-years (n=448) 
 
Count  
Auditor name Freq % Freq  
Fee  
Auditor name 
Average fee 
per Audit  
(in $1,000) 
Total fees 
(in $1,000) 
% of 
total fees 
1 BDO Limited CPAs (HK) 22 4.9% 1 Deloitte & Touche LLP     1,125.1      13,500.7  9.5% 
2 Goldman Parks Kurland Mohidin  21 4.7% 2 KPMG LLP        782.5      10,955.3  7.7% 
3 Friedman LLP 18 4.0% 3 Weinberg & Company           679.5          8,833.7  6.2% 
3 PKF Hong Kong 18 4.0% 4 Ernst & Young LLP        725.3        7,252.7  5.1% 
3 Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk LLP 18 4.0% 5 Frazer Frost LLP          444.5          7,112.2  5.0% 
6 Moore Stephens Wurth Frazer & Torbet  16 3.6% 6 GHP Horwath PC          521.5          6,258.0  4.4% 
6 Frazer Frost LLP 16 3.6% 7 BDO Limited CPAs (HK)          283.0          6,226.3  4.4% 
8 KPMG LLP 14 3.1% 8 Moore Stephens Wurth Frazer & Torbet          374.6          5,993.5  4.2% 
9 Weinberg & Company  13 2.9% 9 Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk LLP          266.8          4,802.7  3.4% 
10 Deloitte & Touche LLP 12 2.7% 10 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP     1,175.2        4,700.7  3.3% 
10 Sherb & Co LLP 12 2.7% 11 Grant Thornton LLP          579.8          4,638.2  3.3% 
10 Samuel H Wong & Co LLP 12 2.7% 12 Friedman LLP          255.7          4,602.8  3.2% 
10 GHP Horwath PC 12 2.7% 13 Goldman Kurland & Mohidin          204.1          4,286.2  3.0% 
10 Goldman Kurland & Mohidin 12 2.7% 14 Crowe Horwath HK CPA Ltd          327.4          3,601.4  2.5% 
15 Crowe Horwath HK CPA Ltd 11 2.5% 15 PKF Hong Kong          175.2          3,153.2  2.2% 
16 Ernst & Young LLP 10 2.2% 
     34 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 4 0.9% 
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Addendum 1  Descriptive statistics for matched firm-years 
 
Panel A: Firm-years for CIPOs and their matched counterparts (N=373 each) 
 
Panel B: Firm-years for CRMs and their matched counterparts (N=417 each) 
      
Tests of 
Differences         
 
      
Tests of 
Differences         
    Mean T Chi Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
 
    Mean T Chi Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
302 REPORT OF IIC             
 
302 REPORT OF IIC             
CIPO firm-years 0.155 
 
***        0.363  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
CRM firm-years 0.487 
 
***        0.500  0.000 0.000 1.000 
U.S. firm-years 0.080            0.272  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.168            0.381  0.000 0.000 0.000 
RANKGROWTH               
 
RANKGROWTH               
CIPO firm-years 6.107 *** 
 
       3.224  4.000 8.000 9.000 
 
CRM firm-years 6.146 *** 
 
       3.261  4.000 8.000 9.000 
U.S. firm-years 4.381            2.814  2.000 5.000 7.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 4.177            3.176  1.000 4.000 7.000 
BUSSEGS                 
 
BUSSEGS                 
CIPO firm-years 1.660 *** 
 
       1.182  1.000 1.000 2.000 
 
CRM firm-years 1.868 
  
       1.471  1.000 1.000 3.000 
U.S. firm-years 1.962            1.429  1.000 1.000 3.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 1.909            1.249  1.000 1.000 3.000 
INVENTORY                 
 
INVENTORY                 
CIPO firm-years 0.049 *** 
 
       0.072  0.000 0.012 0.079 
 
CRM firm-years 0.105 *** 
 
       0.099  0.023 0.074 0.154 
U.S. firm-years 0.077            0.100  0.000 0.026 0.132 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.163            0.130  0.050 0.144 0.240 
MVEa                 
 
MVEa                 
CIPO firm-years 819.2 * 
 
    1,243.2  114.8 320.5 1,042.2 
 
CRM firm-years 127.6 *** 
 
       144.8  29.5 70.0 163.8 
U.S. firm-years 987.3         1,341.2  171.5 437.0 1,231.2 
 
U.S. firm-years 198.7            318.5  22.9 80.8 225.2 
ASSETSa 
       
  
 
ASSETSa 
       
  
CIPO firm-years 729.3 
  
       917.1  198.7 375.3 863.4 
 
CRM firm-years 205.6 
  
       287.5  72.1 123.5 233.7 
U.S. firm-years 722.7            923.9  201.4 370.2 884.3 
 
U.S. firm-years 218.6            506.7  56.4 119.8 247.6 
RANKZ                 
 
RANKZ                 
CIPO firm-years 5.761 
  
       2.477  4.000 6.000 8.000 
 
CRM firm-years 5.669 *** 
 
       2.380  4.000 6.000 8.000 
U.S. firm-years 
 
5.584 
  
       2.473  4.000 6.000 8.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 
 
4.681 
  
       2.699  2.000 5.000 7.000 
FOREIGNSALES               
 
FOREIGNSALES               
CIPO firm-years 0.367 
 
***        0.483  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
CRM firm-years 0.254 
 
***        0.437  0.000 0.000 1.000 
U.S. firm-years   0.649            0.478  0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
U.S. firm-years   0.381            0.489  0.000 0.000 1.000 
RESTRUCTURE 
       
  
 
RESTRUCTURE 
   
  
   
  
CIPO firm-years 0.032 
 
***        0.177  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
CRM firm-years 0.002 
 
***        0.048  0.000 0.000 0.000 
U.S. firm-years 0.375            0.485  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.266            0.445  0.000 0.000 1.000 
M&A                 
 
M&A                 
CIPO firm-years 0.434 
  
       0.496  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
CRM firm-years 0.182 
 
*        0.385  0.000 0.000 0.000 
U.S. firm-years 0.410            0.493  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.235            0.427  0.000 0.000 0.000 
BIG4AUD                 
 
BIG4AUD       
 
        
CIPO firm-years 0.901 
 
***        0.299  1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
CRM firm-years 0.094 
 
***        0.288  0.000 0.000 0.000 
U.S. firm-years 0.791            0.407  1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.463            0.500  0.000 0.000 1.000 
LOSS                 
 
LOSS                 
CIPO firm-years 0.314 
  
       0.465  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
CRM firm-years 0.221 
 
***        0.413  0.000 0.000 0.000 
U.S. firm-years 0.290            0.454  0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
U.S. firm-years 0.489            0.501  0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
aWinsorized, in millions. T and Chi are t-test and chi-square test significance, respectively. Symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent or 
less. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.
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Addendum 2   Pearson correlations for 302 filers (bottom 14,041 firm-years) and 404 filers (top 11,034 firm-years) 
 
  302IIC A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
404IIC       0.14     0.01     0.20     0.02    (0.01)   (0.04)   (0.01)   (0.03)   (0.10)    0.00    (0.06)   (0.07)    0.10  
CHINA A    0.20      0.22     0.55     0.12    (0.03)   (0.08)   (0.14)   (0.01)   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.05)    0.05     0.00  
IPO B   (0.02)    0.16     (0.06)    0.16    (0.14)   (0.10)   (0.12)   (0.02)    0.08    (0.11)   (0.11)    0.02     0.09  
RM C    0.24     0.71    (0.09)     0.08    (0.01)   (0.06)   (0.08)   (0.04)   (0.18)    0.00    (0.04)    0.02    (0.00) 
RANKGROWTH D    0.02     0.14     0.16     0.11     (0.06)   (0.03)   (0.20)    0.10    (0.06)   (0.06)    0.02     0.19    (0.19) 
BUSSEGS E   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.13)   (0.02)   (0.05)     0.05     0.08     0.15     0.06     0.01     0.10    (0.04)   (0.09) 
FOREIGNSALES F   (0.06)   (0.11)   (0.07)   (0.10)   (0.02)    0.05      0.29     0.18     0.13     0.10     0.14     0.13    (0.07) 
RESTRUCTURE G   (0.05)   (0.17)   (0.09)   (0.13)   (0.19)    0.08     0.29      0.11     0.14     0.03     0.07    (0.15)    0.12  
M&A H   (0.07)   (0.05)    0.02    (0.08)    0.10     0.15     0.20     0.14      0.07    (0.06)    0.08     0.06    (0.12) 
BIG4AUD I   (0.17)   (0.15)    0.15    (0.26)   (0.02)    0.08     0.21     0.21     0.16     (0.03)    0.14    (0.04)   (0.05) 
INVENTORY J    0.01    (0.06)   (0.12)   (0.01)   (0.08)   (0.01)    0.04    (0.01)   (0.10)   (0.13)    (0.06)    0.22    (0.05) 
LNMARKETVAL K   (0.09)   (0.07)   (0.09)   (0.06)    0.02     0.11     0.16     0.10     0.11     0.20    (0.08)     0.06    (0.17) 
RANKZ L   (0.10)    0.07     0.03     0.04     0.21    (0.02)    0.11    (0.13)    0.07     0.04     0.17     0.08     (0.37) 
LOSS M    0.13    (0.03)    0.07    (0.03)   (0.21)   (0.09)   (0.08)    0.10    (0.13)   (0.11)   (0.01)   (0.18)   (0.42) 
  
Bolded correlations are significant at the 5 percent level or less. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
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Addendum 3   First stage of under-reporting analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Population 302 Filers 404 Filers 
Dependent variables 302 302 404 
    
RANKGROWTH 0.079*** 0.015 0.042 
 (0.022) (0.040) (0.045) 
BUSSEGS 0.081* 0.324*** 0.292*** 
 (0.047) (0.083) (0.088) 
FOREIGNSALES -0.233 -0.487* -0.583** 
 (0.141) (0.259) (0.287) 
RESTRUCTURE -0.617*** -0.532 -0.537 
 (0.218) (0.325) (0.372) 
M&A -0.301* -0.902*** -0.503* 
 (0.155) (0.290) (0.305) 
BIG4AUD -0.946*** -0.890*** -0.935*** 
 (0.161) (0.272) (0.289) 
INVENTORY -0.111 3.223*** 2.568** 
 (0.591) (1.162) (1.277) 
LNMARKETVAL 0.045 -0.182 -0.198 
 (0.071) (0.145) (0.160) 
RANKZ -0.115*** -0.246*** -0.175*** 
 (0.031) (0.061) (0.066) 
LOSS 0.276* 0.242 0.148 
 (0.163) (0.310) (0.344) 
Constant -0.999** 0.175 -0.195 
 (0.484) (1.041) (1.132) 
    
Observations 1,580 750 750 
Exchange dummies YES YES YES 
Industry dummies NO NO NO 
Likelihood ratio, χ2 184*** 121.2*** 88.46*** 
Wald, χ2 158.4*** 91.35*** 75.15*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.108 0.203 0.174 
 
Logistic regressions of equation (2). The sample for column (1) includes all CIPOs and 
CRMs and their matched firms; and columns (2) and (3) are all 404 filing CIPOs and 
CRMs and their matched firms Significance tests are Wald Chi-square tests. Symbols 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent or less. Exchange indicators are 
NASDAQ, OTC, and PINK (intercept contains NYSE/AMEX). Variable definitions are 
provided in the Appendix. 
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Addendum 4   Matched univariate tests of differences in ICMW types 
 
Panel A: 302 filers CIPO Match   CRM Match   
    (n=373) (n=373)   (n=437) (n=437)   
Key Accounting code descriptions             
15 Acc - Accounts/loans receivable, investments and cash issues 3.22% 1.34%   14.42% 3.20% *** 
16 Acc - PPE, intangible or fixed asset (value/diminution) issues 1.61        1.61   7.09  2.97  *** 
32 Acc - Inventory, vendor and cost of sales issues      2.14       3.22        11.67       6.41  ** 
33 Acc - Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures      1.34       1.61         9.84       5.26  ** 
38 Acc - Foreign, related party, affiliated and/or subsidiary issues      3.75       2.41        11.90       4.35  *** 
39 Acc - Revenue recognition issues      5.63       3.22         9.84       6.64    
40 
Acc - Fin statement, footnote, US GAAP conversion, segment 
disclosures     10.72       1.07  ***     29.98       2.06  *** 
41 Acc - Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other (FAS 109) issues      1.88       3.22         5.03       4.81    
47 Acc - Debt, quasi-debt, warrants and equity (BCF) security issues      1.34       0.54        10.53       2.06  *** 
68 Acc - Unspecified/unidentified/inapplicable FASB/GAAP issues     11.53       1.34  ***     31.81       6.86  *** 
  Other code descriptions             
49 DC - Restatement (recent past or pending) evident 0.80% 2.95% * 9.38% 5.95%   
50 DC - Financial close/policy/information accumulation/timeliness issues     19.57       8.04  ***     53.32      18.31  *** 
51 DC - Personnel inadequacies/segregation of duty issues     25.74       6.17  ***     53.78      16.93  *** 
52 DC - Information technology, software, access/security issues      6.70       4.56         9.38       9.38    
53 DC - Period-end close and non-routine adjustment issues      3.75       4.56        12.36       4.81  *** 
55 DC - Remediation of disclosure control weakness asserted      6.70       4.29         4.35       5.03    
56 DC - Acquisition-related integration and/or challenges noted      5.09       4.29         8.92       6.41    
63 DC - Section 404 adverse report (recent past/pending) filed      8.85       5.90        48.51      15.79  *** 
70 DC - Board, audit committee, corporate governance issues      3.22       0.80  **      9.61       1.83  *** 
85 DC - Fraud risk program/assessment/management      1.61       0.54         7.32       2.06  *** 
                
Panel B: 404 filers (n=262) (n=262)  
(n=122) (n=122)   
                
Key  Accounting code descriptions             
15 Acc - Accounts/loans receivable, investments and cash issues 1.91% 1.15%   18.64% 5.08% *** 
16 Acc - PPE, intangible or fixed asset (value/diminution) issues    0.76      -          13.56     3.39  *** 
32 Acc - Inventory, vendor, and cost of sales issues    1.91     2.67        16.10     5.93  ** 
33 Acc - Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures    0.38     1.15        10.17     6.78    
38 Acc - Foreign, related party, affiliated and/or subsidiary issues    3.44     1.53        14.41     2.54  *** 
39 Acc - Revenue recognition issues    4.58     3.82       7.63     5.08    
40 
Acc - Fin statement, footnote, US GAAP conversion, segment 
disclosures    5.73     0.38  ***     19.49     2.54  *** 
41 Acc - Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other (FAS 109) issues    0.76     2.29        11.86     3.39  ** 
47 Acc - Debt, quasi-debt, warrants and equity (BCF) security issues    0.76      -          11.86     0.85  *** 
68 Acc - Unspecified/unidentified/inapplicable FASB/GAAP issues    3.82      -    ***     22.88     5.08  *** 
  Other code descriptions             
49 DC - Restatement (recent past or pending) evident 0.76% 3.44% * 12.71% 6.78%   
50 DC - Financial close/policy/information accumulation/timeliness issues    9.16     6.11        50.00      13.56  *** 
51 DC - Personnel inadequacies/segregation of duty issues     16.41     3.82  ***     52.54      12.71  *** 
52 DC - Information technology, software, access/security issues    3.82     3.82        12.71     7.63    
53 DC - Period-end close and non-routine adjustment issues    3.44     3.82        13.56     1.69  *** 
55 DC - Remediation of disclosure control weakness asserted    6.87     3.05  *    9.32     3.39    
56 DC - Acquisition-related integration and/or challenges noted    5.73     3.05        11.02     1.69  *** 
63 DC - Section 404 adverse report (recent past/pending) filed    6.49     4.96        46.61      11.02  *** 
70 DC - Board, audit committee, corporate governance issues    1.15     0.76       2.54     3.39    
85 DC - Fraud risk program/assessment/management     -       0.38       5.93     3.39    
 
Symbols ***, **, * indicates Fisher's exact test (two-sided) significance at 10, 5, or 1 percent or better. 
